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ANTONIN SCALIA, BARUCH SPINOZA, AND 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
CHURCH AND STATE 
Steven Goldberg* 
INTRODUCfION 
In a series of opinions interpreting the Free Exercise, Non-
establishment, and Due Process Clauses, Justice Antonin Scalia 
has consistently held that the legislature detennines the boundary 
between church and state in American law. While freedom of 
belief remains inviolate, external religious practices are subject to 
a remarkable degree of legislative control. 
The breadth of Scalia's views becomes clear only when a 
variety of holdings in different areas are seen together. Only then 
do we see that legislatures decide whether church rituals will be 
exempt from general laws, whether public displays of civic religion 
serve societal goals, and whether church schools should even be 
allowed to exist as an alternative to the public schools.! 
One surprising outcome of this approach is that it is likely to 
lead Scalia to favor increased secular scrutiny of internal church 
matters. Under Scalia's approach, a church's decision to 
excommunicate a member could be challenged in a cause of action 
for slander or trespass if that decision affected the member's 
reputation or property.2 Justice Scalia does not always defer to 
legislative choices when constitutional claims are raised. He has 
ruled, for example, that legislatures cannot ban the burning of the 
American flag,3 nor can they enact certain affirmative action 
programs.4 When the bOLndary between church and state is at 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful for comments 
from Larry Alexander, Lisa Heinzerling, Heidi Hurd, David Luban, Louis Michael 
Seidman, Girardeau Spann, and Mark Tushnet. I would like to thank Jennifer Cook and 
Jennifer A. Kennedy for their research assistance. 
1 See infra Part II. 
2 See infra Part III. 
3 Scalia joined the majority opinions in Texas v. lohnson, 491 U.S. 3m (1989), and 
United States v. Eichm11n, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
4 See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 u.s. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
653 
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issue, however, he has consistently expressed the fear that the 
unelected federal judiciary is particularly ill-suited to making the 
basic choice between societal needs and those of a religious group. 
If the courts are to be involved, it must be at the behest of the 
elected legislature. The fundamental point is that the legislature, 
as the embodiment of sovereign power, must leave religious beliefs 
alone, but it must also have broad power to regulate religious 
practices and religion's role in public life. 
As Scalia himself has noted, John Locke's writings provide 
support for the central role of the state in regulating religious 
activities.5 But the thinker who perhaps comes the closest to 
Scalia's views is Spinoza. . 
Baruch Spinoza, whose family fled the Inquisition and who 
was himself. excommunicated from his Jewish congregation, 
developed a political philosophy which combined one of the first 
calls for freedom of religious belief with a strong endorsement of 
the secular sovereign's power over all external religious matters.6 
A look at Spinoza's thought is illuminating because it 
demonstrates the power and the breadth of the argument that the 
sovereign must have the final say over external manifestations of 
faith. Reacting to the power of the church in his day, Spinoza 
feared that a just society could not exist if religious groups could 
control the behavior of individuals. While the sovereign had to 
respect private beliefs, only the sovereign could rationally 
structure external acts. Spinoza may have pointed the way Scalia 
is headed when Spinoza explicitly extended this principle to 
sovereign control over excommunication decisions. 
Spinoza is not cited by Scalia, nor was Spinoza a direct 
influence on the framers of the Constitution.7 What we see instead 
when we look at Spinoza's and Scalia's work is the logical 
consequences that flow from certain basic assumptions about the 
relationship between church and state. 
I begin with an outline of Spinoza's philosophy on church and 
state, followed by a demonstration that Scalia is headed in the 
concurring). 
5 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 540 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part). 
6 See infra Part I. 
7 Spinoza's philosophical views were so controversial that after his death in 1677 he 
endured "a century of obloquy." S.H. MELLONE, THE DAWN OF MODERN THOUGHT: 
DESCARTES, SPINOZA, LEIBNIZ 53 (1930). See also MARGARET GULLAN-WHUR, 
WITHIN REASON: A LIFE OF SPINOZA 304-16 (1998) (providing a recent analysis of 
Spinoza's influence). Professor McConnell includes Spinoza in a long list of political 
thinkers who made a contribution, "however indirect," to the American approach 
regarding the relationship between church and state. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins 
and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1430 
(1990). 
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same direction. I conclude by considering how Spinoza and Scalia 
might react to recent litigation in South Dakota involving an 
excommunication from a close-knit religious community, the 
Hutterite Church. 
I. SPINOZA'S VIEW OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
In 1623, Baruch Spinoza's father arrived in Amsterdam after 
fleeing the Inquisition in Portugal, which was even harsher than its 
Spanish counterpart.8 In both countries, Jews were forced to 
convert or leave.9 Those who did convert, were suspected, often 
with reason, of retainihg their Jewish beliefs. lO They were 
relentlessly interrogated and tortured to see if their conversion had 
been genuine.l\ Therefore, many Jews fled to Amsterdam, where 
the Jewish community was afforded limited freedom.12 
Spinoza grew up in Amsterdam's Jewish community, studying 
at the Hebrew school and attending services at the synagogue.13 
At a young age, however, he began to develop controversial ideas. 
He believed, for example, that the Bible was not literally true, and 
he rejected the idea that God was a judge who punished or 
rewarded people.14 Apparently because of his refusal to recant 
such beliefs, he was excommunicated from the Jewish 
community.IS The Jewish leadership may in part have been 
motivated by a concern that the Amsterdam authorities would 
have punished the Jewish community for harboring someone with 
such dangerous beliefs.16 
Working as an independent scholar, Spinoza had contact with 
Mennonites, Quakers, and prominent thinkers such as Leibniz.17 
His own views remained too extreme to be openly discussed; 
indeed, virtually none of his work was published in his lifetime 
under his own name.18 In time, however, his work exerted an 
8 See STEVEN NADLER, SPINOZA: A LIFE 3-4, 31-32 (1999). 
9 See id. at 3-4. 
10 See id. at 4. 
II For a discussion of the Inquisition and its methods in Spain and Portugal, see CECIL 
ROTH, A HISTORY OFTHE MARRANOS 29-145 (1932). 
12 See Stuart HAMPSHIRE, SPINOZA 227-29 (1973). 
13 See id. 
14 See NADLER, supra note 8, at 131-38. 
IS See id. at 116-54. 
16 See id. at 148-53; see also HAMPSHIRE, supra note 12, at 229. 
17 See NADLER, supra note 8, at 155-73. For Leibniz's reaction to Spinoza, see 
GULLAN-WHUR, supra note 7, at 304-05. 
18 See JOSEPH RATNER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA xix-xx (1954). 
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important influence on philosophy in areas ranging from the 
question of determinism to political theory.19 
Spinoza wrote explicitly on the proper relationship between 
the church and the secular state. The matter was of great practical 
importance in his time. In mid-seventeenth century Amsterdam, 
the secular government had some authority, but the Calvinist 
Church was enormously powerfuPo Elsewhere at that time, the 
Catholic Church held even greater power.21 And, of course, 
Spinoza himself had seen how even the minority Jewish 
community could stifle free thought among its members.22 It is 
clear from Spinoza's work that he identified the secular authorities 
as a vital counterweight to the oppressive authority of the church 
and as offering the best opportunity for the flourishing of reason.23 
To Spinoza, the exercise of reason was the ultimate goal because it 
fostered self-preservation, the satisfaction of wants, and the means 
for understanding the natural order of the universe.24 
Spinoza believed that the "most natural" type of secular state, 
that was best at preserving the "freedom which nature grants to 
every man," was democracy.25 While he believed other forms of 
secular government could succeed, he was the first modem 
political philosopher to call himself a democrat.26 Democracies 
fostered liberty and fought irrationality because "in a democracy 
there is less danger of a government behaving unreasonably, for it 
is practically impossible for the majority of a single assembly, if it 
is of some size, to agree on the same piece of folly. "27 
On the relationship of church to state, Spinoza began· by 
asserting that the religious beliefs of individuals should be 
respected whether they represented majority or minority 
sentiments.28 The secular state, he argued, lacked the power and 
19 See, e.g., HAMPSHIRE, supra note 12, at 27-28, 177; LEWIS SAMUEL FEUER, 
SPINOZA AND THE RISE OF LIBERALISM (1987). 
20 See NADLER, supra note 8, at 12-14; see also HENRY E. ALLISON, BENEDICT DE 
SPINOZA: AN INTRODUCTION 226 (1987). 
21 Galileo's trial, for example, took place in 1633. See IAN G. BARBOUR, RELIGION 
AND SCIENCE 15 (1997). 
22 See GULLAN-WHUR, supra note 7, at 194. 
23 See HAMPSHIRE, supra note 12, at 200-01; see also STEVEN B. SMITH, SPINOZA, 
LIBERALISM, AND THE QUESTION OF JEWISH IDENTITY 154 (1997). 
24 See HAMPSHIRE, supra note 12, at 182. 
25 BARUCH SPINOZA, TRACTATUS THEOLOGICO-POLITICUS 243 (Samuel Shirley 
trans., 1991). For discussions and variant translations of this passage, see ALLISON, supra 
note 20, at 192; see also SMITH, supra note 23, at 136. 
26 See FEUER, supra note 19, at 106. For a critique of Spinoza's views on democracy, 
see ALLISON, supra note 20, at 203-04. 
27 SPINOZA, supra note 25, at 242. 
28 See id. at 280 ("[I]nward worship of God and piety itself belong to the sphere of 
individual right .... "). 
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therefore the right to change these beliefs.29 This may seem like a 
modest proposal today, but it was an important proposition in its 
time.30 
But when religious beliefs turned into external practices, 
Spinoza believed the state had the authority to regulate those 
practices.3! Only the state could determine and enforce what was 
best for the population as a whole.32 Thus, the state would even 
have final authority over decisions by religious groups "to 
excommunicate or to accept [new members] into the church."33 
For Spinoza, the welfare of the people "is the highest law .... 
[S]ince it is the duty of the sovereign alone to decide what is 
necessary for the welfare of the entire people ... it follows that it 
is also the duty of the sovereign alone to decide what form piety 
towards one's neighbor should take .... "34 
Spinoza further believed that the state should establish a kind 
of broad civic religion, that is, the state should foster belief in 
certain basic religious principles.35 Other religions would be 
allowed to exist, but it was clear the state religion would be 
favored. For example, while the established state religion should 
build temples that would "be large and costly," other religions 
would be limited to having temples that were "small ... and on 
sites at some little distance one from another."36 
There is less conflict than may appear between the established 
state religion and the limited, but real, freedom for religious 
minorities that Spinoza envisioned. The central principle of 
Spinoza's civic religion was that everyone ought to love one's 
neighbor, and thus everyone ought to perform acts of justice and 
charity.37 For Spinoza, the civic religion was a means of fostering 
religious toleration, indeed that was the primary reason for having 
the government establish such a religion.38 
In sum, authority over religion was given to the secular state, 
rather than to the oppressive and irrational Church. There would 
be no Inquisitions into personal belief, and the state through its 
29 See SMITH, supra note 23, at 156-60. 
30 See id. 
31 See NADLER, supra note 8, at 284. 
32 See id. 
33 SPINOZA, supra note 25, at 286. 
34 [d. at 284. 
35 See ALLISON, supra note 20, at 226; HAMPSHIRE, supra note 12, at 200. 
36 BARUCH SPINOZA, A 'fHEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE AND A POLITICAL 
TREATISE 368 (RH.M. Elwes trans., 1951). 
37 See SPINOZA, supra note 25, at 224 (stating that everyone "must worship by 
practising justice and charity to their neighbour"); see also NADLER, supra note 8, at 280. 
38 See SMITH, supra note 23, at 116; ALLISON, supra note 20, at 226. 
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own civic religion would foster tolerance. However, when religion 
affected external behavior towards one's fellow citizens, the state 
had the ultimate authority to decide whether to step in. 
II. SCALIA'S VIEW OF CHURCH AND STATE 
Justice Scalia's view that the legislature should have 
remarkable latitude in determining the relationship between 
church and state received its fullest exposition in Employment 
Division v. Smith.39 Scalia wrote the Court's opinion upholding the 
application of a state law banning peyote use in a religious 
ceremony.4O 
Scalia began, as Spinoza did, with a ringing defense of an 
individual's freedom of religious belief: "the First Amendment 
obviously excludes all 'governmental regulation of religious beliefs 
as such."'41 But the free exercise of religion does not extend, Scalia 
held, to the performance of "physical acts" that contravene a 
neutral, generally applicable legislative enactment.42 Among the 
examples he gave of laws that could constitutionally be applied to 
outlaw sincere religious beliefs were laws against polygamy, child 
labor, draft evasion, wearing a yarmulke when in the military, and 
failure to obtain a social security number.43 In short, all instances 
of the "performance of (or abstention from) physical acts" in the 
name of religion are subject to generally applicable, neutral 
legislative contro1.44 Moreover, although not obligated to do 'so, 
legislatures have the power to exempt religious activities from its 
laws. For example, a legislature could ban peyote, or it could 
exempt religious uses of the drug without exempting other uses.45 
Neither the Free Exercise nor the Non-establishment Clause limits 
the legislature in making such judgments. 
In locating this sweeping power in the legislature, Scalia 
rejected two alternative places where the power might be placed. 
First, neither churches nor religious individuals themselves could . 
be given the authority to decide whether religious beliefs should 
39 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
40 See id. at 874. 
41 [d. at 877 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,402 (1963» (emphasis in original). 
42 See id. at 877, 878-90. 
43 See id. at 879-84 (citing with approval Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); 
Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); 
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); and Bown v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986». 
44 [d. at 877, 878-90. 
45 See id. at 890. 
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overcome the law. This would fatally undermine the state, since it 
would "'permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."'46 
Citing Frankfurter, Scalia argued that "'[t]he mere possession of 
religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a 
political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of 
political responsibilities. "'47 
In Spinoza's day, when churches possessed vast, quasi-
governmental powers, this assertion of secular supremacy over 
churches was a bold position. By the time of Smith, the reduced 
power of churches, combined with the multiplicity of religious 
beliefs extant in the United States, made this part of Scalia's 
argument uncontroversial. The controversy came because Scalia 
rejected a second alternative place where the power to draw the 
boundary between church and state might be located-the 
unelected federal judiciary. 
Prior to Smith, the federal judiciary had considerable power in 
this regard. Under Sherbert v. Verner,48 government actions that 
substantially burdened a religious practice had to be justified by a 
compelling government interest. If the court believed no such 
interest existed, it would exempt the religious practice from the 
law.49 Scalia rejected this approach. Judges had no authority to 
"weigh the social importance of all laws" against religious beliefs.50 
If the compelling state interest test were taken seriously, judges, 
confronting the diversity of American religious beliefs, would 
exempt individuals and groups from a wide range of laws, thus 
"courting anarchy."51 Nor would matters be improved if the 
compelling state interest test were limited to conduct that was 
"central" to an individual's religious beliefs.52 Judges lack the 
ability and the authority to decide when a religious practice is 
"central." "What principle of law or logic," Scalia argued, "can be 
brought to bear to contradict a believer's assertion that a 
particular act is 'central' to his personal faith?"53 
Smith was enormously controversial because of its elimination 
of the judicial role in free exercise cases. Within a few years, 
Congress enacted and the President signed the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, which attempted to restore the pre-Smith 
46 [d. at 879 (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67). 
47 [d. (quoting Minersville School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 
(1940)). 
48 374 U.S. 398,406 (1963). 
49 See id. 
50 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (1990). 
51 [d. at 888. 
52 [d. at 886 (citation omitted). 
53 [d. at 887. 
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approach.54 Under this statute, when a law is challenged on the 
ground that it substantially burdens a person's exercise of religion, 
the court must determine if the burden is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest.55 In Boerne v. Fiores,56 the 
Supreme Court struck down this statute on the ground that it 
exceeded Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to enact legislation enforcing the Free Exercise 
Clause.57 
In Boerne, Justice Scalia took the occasion to reaffirm his 
support for Smith.58 The facts of Boerne and Scalia's reaction to 
those facts demonstrate that his sweeping view of legislative power 
in this area is quite close to that of Spinoza's. 
Boerne arose when a Catholic Church in Boerne, Texas 
needed to enlarge its building, which dated to 1923 and was built in 
a mission style that reflected the region's history.59 The church had 
room for only 230 worshipers, meaning that 40 to 60 parishioners 
could not be accommodated at some masses.60 When the 
Archbishop applied for a building permit so construction could 
begin, the Boerne City Council denied the application on the 
ground that enlarging the church was inconsistent with the city's 
historic landmark preservation plan.61 The church went to court 
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, arguing that the 
inability to accommodate parishioners for mass substantially 
burdened free exercise and that preserving this replica of the 
mission style was not a compelling government interest.62 
In Boerne, Scalia vigorously defended the Smith approach, 
under which the church must make its case before the 
representative branches of government, not the courts.63 The 
historic record at the time the Constitution was written is 
consistent, Scalia argued, with the view that religious exercise is 
subject to any general law governing conduct.64 This was in accord 
54 See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511-15 (1997). 
55 See id. at 515. 
56 521 U.S. at 507 (1997). 
57 See id. at 512. 
58 See id. at 537-44 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). Scalia's concurrence here, in a land 
use case, makes clear that Smith was not limited to criminal laws that burden free exercise. 
59 See id. at 511-12. ' 
60 See id. at 512. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. at 537-44 (Scalia, 1., concurring in part). 
64 See id, at 537. For a full exposition of the contrary view, see McConnell, supra note 
7, at 1410-1517. For an argument that Scalia's general desire to treat religion as an 
ordinary participant in the political process is inconsistent with the Framers' intent, see 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Justice Scalia and the Religion Clauses, 22 U. HAw. L. REv. 449, 
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with the "background political philosophy of the age (associate.d 
most prominently with John Locke) .... "65 The state is free not 
only to prohibit religious exercises in cases of "violence or force," 
but in all cases where those exercises conflict with the general 
law.66 Scalia also went beyond the historical record to defend once 
again, on institutional grounds, the result in Smith: "[S]hall it be 
the determination of this Court, or rather of the people, 
whether . .. church construction will be exempt from zoning 
laws? ... It shall be the people."67 
At first blush, the application of general zoning and historic 
preservation laws may seem rather distant from Spinoza's view 
that the state can limit minority religions to temples that are 
"small ... and on sites at some little distance one from another.,,68 
After all, Scalia agrees with every other member of the Court that 
a legislature cannot openly single out and ban a minority religious 
practice on the grounds that it disagrees with that practice.69 But 
the distance may be more apparent than real. The problem faced 
by the church in Boerne, Texas was the tip of an iceberg. 
Religious groups often maintain that zoning restrictions are 
imposed in an unfair way; indeed, they contend that minority 
religions fare less well than powerful ones when governmental 
authorities decide whether to permit expansion of a building, or 
additional parking, or worship services in a private home.70 While 
the authorities do not admit that they are tougher on religious 
groups with little political power, they often appear to behave this 
way:71 The problem is so acute that after Boerne, Congress 
enacted a federal statute that attempts to restore the pre-Smith 
compelling state interest test in situations where religious exercise 
conflicts with land use restrictions.72 Congress hopes that the 
Court may be more receptive to this targeted approach than it was 
to the general effort to restore pre-Smith law, which the Court 
rejected in Boerne.73 
466-67 (2000). 
65 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 540 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). 
66 See id. 
67 [d. at 544. 
68 SPINOZA, supra note 36, at 368. 
69 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 558-59 
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
70 See, e.g., Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearing on HR. 4019 Before the 
Subcomm on the Constitution, House Comm on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1998) 
(prepared testimony of Douglas Laycock). 
71 [d.; see also id. (testimony of Bruce D. Shoulson). 
72 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.c. §2000cc 
(Supp. 2001); see also Michael D. Shear & Dan Eggen, Church Zoning Eased, Raising Fear 
of Fights, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2000, at Bl. 
73 See supra note 70. 
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Justice Scalia is well aware that minority religions might fare 
poorly at times under Smith. His goal is not to pick winners or 
losers in individual disputes between church and state, but to 
defend a general institutional approach to the matter. As he wrote 
in Smith: 
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political 
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious 
practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable 
consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a 
system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which 
judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the 
centrality of all religious beliefs.74 
Like Scalia, Spinoza's central point was institutional. 
Whether a society ends up with large temples or small should be 
determined by the sovereign, which reflects what is best for the 
people, not by the churches themselves which may be fostering 
superstition and oppression rather than reason. 
Of course, Scalia and Spinoza may have different motivations 
for making these similar institutional judgments. Scalia does not 
explicitly rely on the idea that legislatures are more rational than 
alternative institutions such as the courts, although he may believe 
they are. Scalia's focus is instead on legitimacy: legislatures are 
elected;. federal judges are not. But he ends up in the same place 
Spinoza does. 
When we turn from free exercise to non-establishment, it 
once again seems that the gap between Scalia and Spinoza is large. 
Scalia, after all, would never dispute that the Non-establishment 
Clause prevents the government from formally designating a state 
religion, even the sort of broad civic religion favored by Spinoza. 
However, once again the gap is narrower than it first appears. 
Scalia had occasion to discuss the role of civic religion in Lee 
v. Weisman, 75 which concerned the constitutionality of a 
commencement prayer at a public middle school in Providence, 
Rhode Island. Providence school officials provided clergy who 
were invited to offer prayers with a pamphlet titled "Guidelines 
for Civic Occasions. "76 These guidelines recommended that 
prayers at events like commencement be written with 
"inclusiveness and sensitivity."77 At the graduation ceremony in 
question, a Rabbi was given the pamphlet and was also advised 
74 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
75 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
76 Id. at 58l. 
77 Id. (quotations omitted). 
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that his invocation and benediction should be "nonsectarian. "78 
The Rabbi's prayers were designed to meet these standards. 
His invocation, for example,·began: 
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave: 
For the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the 
rights of minorities are protected, we thank You. May these 
young men and women grow up to enrich it. . 
For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new 
graduates grow up to guard it. 
For the political process of America in which all its citizens may 
participate, for its court system where all may seek justice we 
thank You .... 79 
The Supreme Court found the offering of this prayer at 
commencement to be in violation of the Non-establishment 
Clause.so The Court found indirect public and peer pressure to 
make students who did not share the prayers' sentiments stand or 
at least maintain respectful silence during the prayer.81 A 
dissenting student could reasonably believe that her own standing 
or sitting in silence could be misinterpreted as approval of the 
ceremony.82 
Justice Kennedy, in his opinion for the Court, recognized that 
the case could be seen as involving the use of a nonsectarian civic 
religion at a public function, but he believed that this should not 
change the outcome: 
;There may be some support, as an empirical observation ... 
, " that there has emerged in this country a civic religion, one 
which is tolerated when sectarian exercises are not.... If 
common ground can be defined which permits once conflicting 
faiths to express the shared conviction that there is an ethic and 
a morality which transcend human invention, the sense of 
community and purpose sought by all decent societies might be 
advanced. But though the First Amendment does not allow the 
government to stifle prayers which aspire to these ends, neither 
does it permit the government to undertake that task for itself.83 
Justice Scalia, in dissent, noted the long history in the United 
States of public ceremonies which included prayers of 
thanksgiving, including a long history of prayers at public 
78 [d. 
79 [d. at 581-82 (citation omitted). 
80 See id. at 584-86. 
81 See id. at 593. 
82 See id. 
83 [d. at 589 (citations omitted). 
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commencement exercises.84 Additionally, he argued that there was 
no coercion involved in simply standing or sitting quietly while 
such a prayer is given.85 Most importantly, he concluded with a 
strong affirmation of the public value of nonsectarian prayer. 
Making precisely the argument Spinoza had made, he maintained 
that if the state chooses to foster civic religion it will be fostering 
toleration and religious liberty: 
The Founders of our Republic knew the fearsome potential of 
sectarian religious belief to generate civil dissension and civil 
strife. And they also know that nothing, absolutely nothing, is 
so inclined to foster among religious believers of various faiths a 
toleration-no, an affection-for one another than voluntarily 
joining in prayer together, to the God whom they all worship 
and seek .... The Baptist or Catholic who heard and joined in 
the simple and inspiring prayers of Rabbi Gutterman on this 
official and patriotic occasion was inoculated from religious 
bigotry and prejudice in a manner that cannot be replicated. To 
deprive our society of that important unifying mechanism, in 
order to spare the nonbeliever what seems to me the minimal 
inconvenience of standing or even sitting in respectful 
nonparticipation, is as senseless in policy as it is unsupported in 
law.86 
Other opinions by Scalia interpreting the Non-establishment 
Clause are consistent with his dissent in Lee. He has, for example, 
supported giving the legislature power to decide whether to fund 
programs that include parochial schools,87 or to celebrate religious 
holidays in the public square,88 or to teach creation science in 
public schools.89 
So Smith and Lee go hand-in-hand. But the most dramatic 
demonstration of Scalia's belief in legislative supremacy in the 
church-state arena comes not in his interpretation of the Religion 
Clauses, but in his attack on a due process decision, Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters,90 which is a cornerstone of religious freedom in 
the United States. 
Il4 See id. at 631, 633-36 (Scalia, 1., dissenting). 
85 See id. at 637-39. 
86 Id. at 646. 
87 In Mitchell v. Helms, 530 u.s. 793, 801 (2000), Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas' 
opinion upholding neutral aid programs that include religious schools, even if the aid is 
direct, divertible, and goes to pervasively sectarian schools. 
88 In County of Allegheny v. Am Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) 
(Kennedy, 1., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part), Justice Scalia 
joined Justice Kennedy's opinion upholding the display of a creche on the courthouse 
steps and a menorah in front of a government office building. 
89 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 610 (1987) (Scalia, 1., dissenting). 
'Xl 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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Stephen L. Carter has called Pierce "almost certainly" the 
Supreme Court opinion "most supportive of the survival of 
religious communities."91 Pierce holds that parents have a 
constitutional right to send their children to private schools.92 
Although Pierce never mentions freedom of religion, it has 
become the basis of a religious school option that is vital to 
millions of Americans.93 The 1925 decision in Pierce was 
unanimous, and until Justice Scalia, no Supreme Court Justice had 
ever questioned iU4 
Pierce arose because Oregon, in 1922, enacted a law requiring 
that all children between the ages of eight and sixteen attend 
public schooP5 The law was triggered in large part by nativist 
opposition to Catholic practices and Catholic schools.96 The 
constitutionality of the statute was challenged by a religious order 
which ran several Catholic schools and by the Hill Military 
Academy, a nonsectarian private schooP7 In Pierce, the Supreme 
Court unanimously held that the statute violated the substantive 
due process right of parents to direct the upbringing of their 
children.98 Justice McReynolds' opinion for the Court held that: 
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments 
in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to 
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction 
from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of 
the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the 
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him 
Jor additional obligations.99 
Pierce proved to be popular across the American political 
spectrum and with the Supreme Court as wel1.1°O While other 
substantive due process decisions, from Lochner101 to Roe102 have 
91 STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A MEDITATION ON LAW, 
RELIGION, AND LoYALTY 35 (1998). 
92 See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530. 
93 For a discussion of the importance of Pierce to parochial schooling, see STEVEN 
GoLDBERG, SEDUCED BY SCIENCE: How AMERICAN RELIGION HAs LoST ITS WAY 
66-67 (1999). 
94 For a discussion of the popUlarity of Pierce in an article criticizing that decision, see 
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as 
Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995 (1992). 
95 See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530. 
96 See WILLIAM G. Ross, FORGING NEW FREEDOMS: NATIVISM, EDUCATION, AND 
THE CONSTITUTION, 1917-1927, at 148-58 (1994). 
97 See id. at 160-61. 
98 See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 510 . 
99 [d. at 535. 
100 See Woodhouse, supra note 94, at 997-98. 
101 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that state maximum hour 
legislation violated the Due Process Clause ). 
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been enormously controversial, Pierce is one limitation on 
legislative power that has been unchallenged. 103 
Unchallenged, that is, until Justice Scalia's opinion in Troxel 
v. Granville104 in 2000, in which the Court struck down a legislative 
provision enacted by the State of Washington. Under the 
Washington law, "any person" may petition "at any time" for 
visitation rights and the court may grant such rights whenever it 
believes visitation will serve a child's best interest. 105 The litigation 
arose when grandparents petitioned to visit their deceased son's 
daughters.106 The mother of the girls opposed the petition, but it 
was granted by a trial court. 107 
The United States Supreme Court found that giving visitation 
decisions to a judge without any deference to the views of fit 
custodial parents was a violation of the parents' substantive due 
process right to raise their children.108 While there was no majority 
opinion, the six Justices in the majority all relied on Pierce. Justice 
O'Connor's plurality opinion for four Justices cited Pierce for the 
proposition that "'[t]he child is not the mere creature of the 
State."'109 Justice Souter's concurrence noted that under Pierce, 
"[e]ven a State's considered judgment about the preferable 
political and religious character of schoolteachers is not entitled to 
prevail over a parent's choice of private school."llo Justice 
Thomas' concurrence held that under Pierce, "parents have a 
fundamental constitutional right to rear their children, including 
the right to determine who shall educate and socialize them."111 
Two of the dissenting Justices did not question Pierce, although 
they argued it was not determinative in this litigation. ll2 
Justice Scalia's dissent, however, directly challenged Pierce.ll3 
He described it as stemming from "an era rich in substantive due 
process holdings that have since been repudiated," and as having 
102 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the Due Process Clause protects a 
woman's decision to tenninate pregnancy). 
103 See Woodhouse, supra note 94, at 996-97. 
104 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
105 Id. at 60. 
106 See id. at 60-1. 
107 See id. at 61. 
108 See id. at 60-80. 
109 Id. at 65 (O'Connor, J.) (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
110 Id. at 78-79 (Souter, 1., concurring in the judgment). 
111 Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Thomas said that he left 
"for another day" the possibility that all substantive due process cases should be 
overruled. Id. But his assertion that Pierce holds that "parents have a fundamental 
constitutional right to rear their children," and that he would "apply strict scrutiny to 
infringements of fundamental rights," along with his concurrence in the judgment makes 
clear that, unlike Justice Scalia, he is not presently ready to set aside Pierce. Id. 
112 See id. at 80 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
113 See id. at 92 (Scalia, 1., dissenting). 
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"small claim to stare decisis protection. "114 While affirming in 
strong terms the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their 
children, he maintained that legislatures, not judges, should decide 
whether and how to protect that right: 
[W]hile I would think it entirely compatible with the 
commitment to representative democracy set forth in the 
founding documents to argue, in legislative chambers or in 
electoral campaigns, that the state has no power to interfere 
with parents' authority over the rearing of their children, I do 
not believe that the power which the Constitution confers upon 
me as a judge entitles me to deny legal effect to laws that (in my 
view) infringe upon what is (in my view) that unenumerated 
right. 115 
In sum, state legislatures should set parental rights, since they 
can "correct their mistakes in a flash," and are "removable by the 
people."116 Troxel did not directly involve the right to send 
children to private schools, but Scalia's attack on Pierce makes 
clear that he would leave this matter to the legislatures. Scalia, 
who graduated from a parochial high school,1l7 is not opposed to 
religious schooling; indeed, he wrote in Troxel that the parental 
right "to direct the upbringing of their children is among the 
'unalienable Rights'" set forth in the Declaration of 
Independence.118 But as with religious practices that violate the 
law or the presence of civic religion in the public square, he would 
leave the boundary between church and state to the legislature. 
Scalia's position in this regard is strong, consistent, and strikingly 
similar to the views advocated by Spinoza. 
III. CHURCH CONTROL OVER EXCOMMUNICATION: 
THE CASE OF THE HUTTERIAN BRETHREN 
As we have seen, one consequence of Spinoza's view on the 
relationship between church and state was that the sovereign 
should have the authority to review decisions by a church to 
excommunicate members. In Spinoza's day, excommunication 
could carry enormous practical consequences: the dissenter might, 
114 Id. 
115 /d. at 91-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
116 Id. at 93. ' 
117 See Jeffrey Rosen, Is Nothing Secular?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 30, 2000, at 44 
(stating that Justice Scalia graduated from Xavier High School, a Jesuit academy in 
Manhattan). 
118 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 91 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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for example, lose the ability to carryon his business.119 SInce the 
state was, for Spinoza, the source of rational policies for serving 
the public good, it should have the authority to decide if an 
excommunication decision served that goal.120 
Would Justice Scalia reach the same result? It is standard 
teaching that courts will abstain from adjudicating cases involving 
the excommunication of church members.121 But Justice Scalia 
may be moving toward challenging that teaching. 
Justice Scalia has not had the opportunity to write an opinion 
addressing this matter. The most recent Supreme Court decision 
involving an internal church dispute is the 1979 case of Jones v. 
Wolf,122 which did not involve excommunication and was decided 
before Scalia joined the Court.. It is worth noting, however, that 
Jones would not pose a precedential barrier if Scalia chose to allow 
adjudication of an excommunication dispute. Jones involved a 
property dispute. The majority of a local Presbyterian 
congregation in Macon, Georgia voted to withdraw from the 
Presbyterian Church of the United States because of doctrinal 
differences.123 Both the national church and the local majority 
claimed ownership of the church property.124 The Georgia courts, 
applying neutral principles of law, examined such documents as 
the deed and the corporate charter of the local church, and 
concluded that, although the Presbyterian Church is a hierarchical 
body, ownership of the property should go to the local group.125 
When the Supreme Court took the case, it approved the 
Georgia court's use of the neutral principles approach.126 This is 
consistent with the approach Scalia took in his opinion for the 
Court in Smith eleven years later, where he held that general 
principles of law do not lose their force because they are being 
applied to a religious group or a religious practice, such as the 
sacramental use of peyote.127 
But Jones was not an excommunication matter. Even those 
scholars who believe that Smith and other cases may foreshadow 
119 See NADLER, supra note 8, at 123. 
120 See supra Part I. 
121 See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on 
Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REv. 1, 44-45 (1998). 
122 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
123 See id. at 597-98. 
124 See id. at 598-99. 
125 See id. at 599-601. 
126 See id. at 602-06. 
127 In analyzing church property cases, Professor Greenawalt concludes that Smith 
lends support to the neutral principles approach taken years earlier in Jones. See Kent 
Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts Over Religious Property, 98 
COLUM. L. REv. 1843, 1906 (1998). 
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greater judicial involvement in church matters are reluctant to 
apply that idea to excommunication.128 Suppose that Scalia were 
confronted with a case in which a member of a church was 
excommunicated because she violated church teachings. Could 
she obtain legal redress? 
Scalia would certainly recognize that there are free speech 
limitations to governmental control over church membership. 
After all, religious groups are not worse off in his view than other 
private organizations. Scalia has written that "private religious 
speech ... is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as 
secular private expression .... [A] free-speech clause without 
religion would be Hamlet without the prince."129 So, just as the 
Boy Scouts can expel a member if keeping him on the rolls would 
undercut their expressive freedom because he advocates policies 
they oppose, so too a religious group could expel a member if 
keeping her on the rolls would undercut their expressive 
freedom. 130 Thus, if a member of a religious group were 
excommunicated because she spoke against church doctrine, the 
group would have a free association claim against government 
efforts to keep her in the church. 
But just as in Spinoza's day, excommunication today can 
involve more than the simple statement, "your views are contrary 
to. ours." Suppose that church doctrine bars adultery, and a 
member is excommunicated with the public pronouncement that 
she had engaged in adultery. Suppose further that she claims that 
this pronouncement was made falsely by the church leadership; 
indeed, they knew it was false when they made it and they made it 
because of a private vendetta. This dissenter might go to court 
under the general state law authorizing suits for slander. 
Everything Scalia has written suggests that he would allow 
this suit to go forward. Under Scalia's Smith opinion, the 
legislature has the power to choose whether or not to exempt 
religious groups from its general law against slander. If it grants 
128 See, e.g., Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of 
Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. L.l. 219 (2000). Professor Idleman ably surveys 
numerous considerations that suggest that courts may increasingly allow tort suits against 
religious entities, even when internal church policies are at stake. He regards it as an open 
question whether the United States Supreme Court will approve of this trend. See id. at 
269-70. However, he suggests that excommunications matters stand on a special footing 
and are less likely to invite judicial involvement. See id. at 237-38. 
129 Capitol Square Rev. and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995) (citations 
omitted). 
130 Scalia joined the Court's opinion in Dale holding that the Boy Scouts had a First 
Amendment free association right to expel an assistant scoutmaster who publicly declared 
he was homosexual. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). This opinion 
noted that free association rights extended to religious groups. [d. at 647-48. 
HeinOnline -- 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 670 2001-2002
670 CARDOZO LA W REVIEW [Vol. 23:2 
such an exemption, the Non-establishment Clause is not violated. 
But if no such exemption is granted, the lawsuit could go 
forward. 131 
Some Justices might believe that allowing this litigation would 
improperly "entangle" church and state under the Supreme 
Court's decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman.132 But Scalia has never 
taken that approach. He has explicitly rejected the Lemon 
decision and has sharply dissented from opinions finding improper 
entanglement. \33 As Smith itself suggests, applying a neutral law to 
a religious practice is not improper entanglement; if there is no 
legislative exemption, it is the required approach. . 
There is an apparent paradox here. A strong thread in 
Scalia's decisions upholding legislative primacy in resolving 
boundary disputes between church and state is the belief that the 
legislature is better suited than the courts to determine where that 
boundary should lie. l34 Thus, legislatures decide whether church 
rituals will be exempt from general laws, rather than courts making 
that decision under a compelling state interest approach to the 
Free Exercise Clause and legislatures decide whether to permit 
nonsectarian prayer at public events rather than courts making 
that decision under the Non-establishment Clause. Indeed, 
legislatures decide whether to permit church schools to exist as an 
alternative to public schools rather than courts making that 
decision under the Due Process Clause.135 
The paradox is that this very deference to the legislature can 
result in a new and surprising role for the courts in policing church 
conduct. For if the legislature decides not to exempt religious 
groups from ordinary rules of law like those governing defamation, 
then internal church matters can wind up in court. They cannot be 
thrown out through the use of doctrines, such as free exercise, non-
establishment, or due process, that trump legislative choices. 
But this paradox is more apparent than real. Scalia's problem 
with judicial involvement in cases like Sherbert v. Verner/ 36 Lee v. 
131 See supra Part 11 
132 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). See also Greenawalt, supra note 126, at 1905-06 (" The 
entanglement worry fits very well with a strong 'hands-off approach; courts should not 
become the adjudicators of religious matters."). 
\33 For Scalia's rejection of Lemon, see Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free 
School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-400 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). For an example of 
Scalia disagreeing with a finding of entanglement, see Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 
1, 43 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that the court should not have found 
improper entanglement when Texas exempted religious periodicals from its sales tax). 
134 See supra Part 11 
135 See supra Part II. 
136 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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Weisman,137 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters138 is that the unelected 
Court is placing its judgments above those of the democratically 
elected legislature in an area-church-state relations-where the 
Court lacks the ability or the authority to do so. Once the 
legislature has authorized a neutral cause of action, the courts can 
adjudicate individual' cases involving religion as legitimately as 
they can any other private matter. Indeed, to do otherwise gives 
religion the sort of special judicial treatment that Scalia opposes. 
Thus, in determining whether a court has jurisdiction of a 
challenge to an excommunication decision by a church, Scalia 
would first determine if such jurisdiction infringes on the church's 
free speech and association. If it does not, the court should be 
willing to apply any applicable neutral legislative rule, unless the 
legislature has stated that religious groups are exempt. In applying 
such a rule, the court may have to interpret church documents or 
teachings, not to determine if they are metaphysically true, but to 
carry out the legislative policies embodied in law. 
Of course, difficult cases will arise under this approach. 
Whether applying a legislative norm infringes on associational 
freedom can be a hard question. A recent excommunication 
controversy involving the Hutterite Church illustrates what 
Scalia's approach would look like in practice. 
The Hutterites are an Anabaptist group founded in 1528 in 
Central Europe.139 Hutterites share with other Anabaptists, 
including the Mennonites and the Amish, certain fundamental 
beliefs such as adult voluntary baptism, the refusal to bear arms, 
and organizing the church itself as a community that follows Jesus' 
model in all areas of life. 140 
From the beginning, Anabaptists faced persecution.141 After 
Spinoza had been excommunicated from the Jewish community in 
mid-seventeenth century Amsterdam, the circle of free thinkers 
with whom he discussed philosophical and religious ideas included 
Mennonites.142 
The Hutterites did not escape such persecution. Their 
137 505 u.s. 577 (1992). 
138 286 u.s. 510 (1925). 
139 See Alvin Esau, Communal Property and Freedom of Religion: Lakeside Colony of 
Hutterian Brethren v. Hofer, in RELIGIOUS CONSCIENCE, THE STATE, AND THE LAW: 
HiSTORICAL CONTEXTS AND CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE 98 (John McLaren & 
Harold Coward eds., 1999). 
140 See id. 
141 See Deerfield Hutterian Ass'n v. Ipswitch Bd. of Educ., 468 F. Supp. 1219, 1223 
(N.D.S.D. 1979). 
142 See ALLISON, supra note 20, at 225; NADLER, supra note 8, at 167-68. 
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founder, Jacob Hutter, was burned at the stake in 1536.143 In the 
late nineteenth century, Hutterites, fleeing continuing persecution 
in Europe, began to settle in the western United States and 
Canada. Today, there are about 35,000 Hutterites in this region, 
organized into roughly 350 colonies. l44 
A distinctive feature of life in Hutterite colonies is a strictly 
communal approach to property, inspired by the Book of Acts, 
Chapters 2 and 4.145 Under the Hutterite system, the members of 
each colony devote all of their time and labor to the colony and 
the church. 146 No individual holds title to real or personal 
property. 147 The church provides all necessities of life, including 
food, clothing, and shelter.148 
In 1999, the Supreme Court of South Dakota was called upon 
to resolve a dispute that arose in the colony known as the 
Tschetter Hutterian Brethren.149 . Since 1992, this colony, along 
with other Hutterite colonies, had been embroiled in a leadership 
dispute. I 50 A book published in that year accused Reverend Jacob 
Kleinsasser, a leader revered in many colonies, of financial 
improprieties. 151 In the Tschetter Hutterian Brethren, the majority 
rejected Reverend Kleinsasser, while a minority remained loyal to 
him.152 
On March 27, 1995, the majority of the Brethren expelled the 
minority from the colony and the church because the minority 
continued to insist on their loyalty to Reverend Kleinsasser. 153 But 
the minority refused to leave. Both factions remained at the 
colony, and each clearly disliked the others' presence. 154 
Ultimately the minority brought a lawsuit, claiming that the larger 
group had committed a variety of torts and other offenses against 
them.155 
In a three to two decision, the Supreme Court of South 
Dakota dismissed the minorities' case.156 Because the case was 
143 See Esau, supra note 139, at 98. 
144 See id. 
145 See Decker v. Tschetter Hutterian Brethren, Inc., 594 N.W. 2d 357, 359-60 & nn.l, 2, 
6 (S.D. 1999). 
146 See id. at 359. 
147 See id. 
148 See id. 
149 See id. at 358-59. 
150 See id. at 360-61. 
lSI See id. at 360. 
152 See id. at 360-61. 
153 See id. at 361. 
154 See id. 
ISS See id. at 361-62. 
156 See id. at 362, 365 .. 
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poorly pleaded and because extremely limited procedures had 
been followed before the trial court dismissed the complaint, it is 
hard to know exactly what went on at the colony.157 The majority 
of the South Dakota Court felt that it did not need to know all the 
details because it viewed this as "a religious dispute rather than a 
secular dispute,"158 believed that it could not become embroiled in 
ecclesiastical matters, and concluded that '[i]f there is an earthly 
forum for adjudication of Plaintiff's allegations, it is not the secular 
courts of this State. "159 
The dissenting Justices emphasized that the complaint alleged 
that defendants cut off electricity to plaintiffs' homes and assaulted 
plaintiffs by intentionally driving vehicles at them. l60 To the 
dissenters, allowing defendants to escape liability in their 
individual capacity was similar to sanctioning "the conduct 
occurring during the Crusades and the Inquisition, just because it 
purports to be done for religious beliefs. "161 
It is not surprising that the majority would overlook the 
dangerous conduct alleged in this case. To the majority, this case 
involved expUlsion from a church. If you are expelled, you can 
avoid these problems by leaving.162 To the dissent, the 
excommunication context did not end the inquiry. 
There is no doubt that Spinoza would hold that. secular 
authorities should resolve this dispute. For Scalia, the result might 
well be the same. Almost certainly the South Dakota legislature 
envisioned that an assault case could lie if one person drives a 
vehicle at another with intent to injure, even in the context of a 
religious dispute. It is also possible that the South Dakota 
legislature envisioned that a tort action would lie if one person cuts 
off electricity to another's home, even if title to that home is held 
by the community as a whole. It might be necessary in such a case 
to examine church rules on what is meant by communal 
ownership, but that fact can hardly justify throwing out a case 
before it begins just because it arises in an excommunication 
context. 
The communal property aspect of ownership in the Hutterite 
Church makes it difficult to separate the undoubted free 
association right of a church to control its membership from the 
157 See id. at 361-62. The dissent found that there had been "totally improper 
procedural short-cuts .... " [d. at 366 (Sabers, J., dissenting). 
158 [d. at 362. 
159 [d. at 365. 
160 See id. at 367. 
161 [d. at 366. 
162 The majority analogized this case to one involving shunning. See id. at 363 n.lO. 
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state's legitimate interest in protecting its citizens. But the 
separation may be possible. The majority of a church does not 
need to assault the minority to make clear that the minority has 
heterodox views. Of course, the legislature of South Dakota might 
conclude that it is prudent, because of' a desire to allow this 
religious community to operate on its own, to exempt communities 
of this sort from various laws. But that decision, in Scalia's view, is 
for the legislature, not the courts. 
Whatever the proper outcome for the Tschetter Hutterite . 
Brethren, the broader implications of Justice Scalia's emerging 
approach to the relationship between church and state is clear. At 
least some excommunications will trigger secular involvement. 
Antonin Scalia will be at least part of the way toward Baruch 
Spinoza's approach to the Inquisition, to his own 
excommunication, and to the emergence of the rational secular 
state. 
